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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v Bonilla'
(decided April 30, 2004)
Benjamin Bonilla was indicted with rape, sodomy and two
counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.2 He pleaded guilty to
Rape in the First Degree and was sentenced to a five-year
determinate term.3 Although he was informed that the maximum
sentence which could be imposed by the court was twenty five
years, neither the court nor his attorney expressly notified Bonilla
that "there would be a period of post release supervision
automatically added to his sentence."4 On a motion made pursuant
to Criminal Procedure Law Section 440.10(l)(h),5 Bonilla asserted
that, since he was not advised of the mandatory period of post
release supervision, his plea was not "knowingly and intelligently
entered and he was denied effective assistance of counsel under
both the Federal6 and State7 Constitutions."8  The Appellate
' 775 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
2 People v. Bonilla, No. 2000-007, 2003 WL 1093042, at *1 (N.Y. County. Ct.
Jan. 29, 2003).3Id
"1d
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1995) provides in pertinent
part: "At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the
ground that . . . the judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the
defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.".
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
7 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 states in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions . . .
8 Bonilla, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 619. In its holding, the court focused on the correct
standard for measuring the effective assistance of counsel, rather than on the
effectiveness of the waiver.
1
Wilder: Assistance of Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2005
TOURO LAWREVIEW
Division reversed the county court's decision denying Bonilla's
motion, holding that the "harmless error" analysis applicable in
both the federal9 and New York ° courts was not the correct
standard for determining Bonilla's claim." The court
acknowledged that there are two different standards for
determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of
counsel; one standard complies with the United States Constitution
and one with New York State Constitution. 2 The court determined
that the proper standard under the United States Constitution is
"whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial,"3 while, under the New York
Constitution, the standard is "whether defendant received
meaningful representation."' 4 Therefore, the court remanded the
case and instructed the trial court to apply the proper standards to
determine whether to grant a hearing on the motion. 5
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c) mandates that the defendant must understand the
nature of the charge, the minimum sentenced provided by the law, and the
maximum sentence provided by the law. This includes any supervised parole or
special release term. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (h) provides in pertinent part: "(a) any
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded."
10 See People v. Melio, 760 N.Y.S.2d 216, 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (stating
that, under the harmless error analysis in New York, the court must decide
"whether the [court's] failure to inform the defendant of postrelease supervision
affected his decision to plead guilty.").
11 Bonilla, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
12 Id at 619.
13 Id. (quoting People v. McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131, 135 (N.Y. 2003)).
14 id.
'5 Id. at 620.
106 [Vol 21
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On July 18, 1999, Bonilla was arrested and charged with
rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree and two counts
of sexual abuse in the first degree.16 The District Attorney made an
offer to Bonilla to plead guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. 17
Bonilla rejected the District Attorney's offer and opted for trial. 8
On the first day of trial, Bonilla asked if he could accept the
District Attorney's previous plea bargain offer, but the court
denied this request.' 9 Subsequently, he asked to plead guilty to
rape in the first degree, which the court allowed.2 ' Bonilla pled
guilty on September 11, 2000 and was sentenced on October 20,
2000 to "a five-year determinate sentence, the minimum sentence
for this offense.'
Before Bonilla was sentenced, the court informed him
twice that the maximum sentence the court could impose was
twenty-five years. 2 Each time the court notified him of this and
asked him whether he understood. Bonilla answered that he did.23
Although he was aware that he could have been sentenced to a
maximum of twenty-five years in prison, he was never expressly
informed by either the court or his attorney "that there would be a
16 Bonilla, 2003 WL 1093042, at *1.
17 Id
19Id
20 Id.
21 Bonilla, 2003 WL 1093042, at *1.
22 id.
23 Id
2005]
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period of post release supervision automatically added to his
sentence." 24
Bonilla claimed that his constitutional rights were violated
when he was not informed of the mandatory period of post release
supervision. 5 Specifically, he contended that his decision to plead
guilty to rape was not "knowingly and intelligently" entered into
and he was denied effective assistance of counsel; a fundamental
right guaranteed under both the Federal and New York State
Constitutions. 6
Therefore, the court determined that Bonilla did not have to
show that had he proceeded to trial, he would have been acquitted
or received a lesser sentence in order to prove that his
constitutional rights had been violated." Rather, the court relied
on the holding in People v. McDonald28 in determining that the
defendant must establish that "but for counsel's errors, [he] would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial. 29
In McDonald, the court stated that, under the Federal
Constitution, the test used to determine " 'the validity of a guilty
plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
24 Id.
25 Bonilla, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 802 N.E.2d at 131.
29 Bonilla, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
[Vol 21
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defendant.' "30 The court went on to explain that those criminal
defendants who claim that their guilty plea was not voluntary and
intelligent in character due to ineffective assistance of counsel
must meet certain requirements, which were established in
Strickland v. Washington.3
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
federal standard for determining whether a defendant had received
ineffective assistance of counsel by establishing a two-part
inquiry. 2  First, the defendant "must show that counsel's
performance was deficient."33 This prong essentially requires that
the defendant demonstrate that counsel's representation did not
meet an "objective standard of reasonableness."34 In enacting this
prong, the Court sought to uphold the general policy that all
"defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel."" Second, also referred to as the
"prejudice prong," the court must determine "whether counsel's
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
the plea process."36 To meet this requirement, the defendant "must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
30 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56
(1985)).
3 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
32 Id. at 687.
33 Id.
34 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58).
35 See McMann v. Richardson, 297 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
36 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
2005]
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on going to trial.""7  Although Strickland dealt with ineffective
assistance of counsel in capital-sentencing proceedings, the
Supreme Court held in Hill v. Lockhart that this two-part standard
is applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out
of the plea process.38
"In many guilty plea cases, the 'prejudice' inquiry will
closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing
ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a
trial."39  Under this analysis, the courts determine whether the
defendant would have opted for trial rather than plead guilty by
determining the likelihood of whether counsel's error would have
changed the outcome of the trial." For example, where a
defendant claims that counsel's error was a failure to advise of a
potential affirmative defense, the decision of whether he was
prejudiced will focus on whether this defense would likely have
succeeded at trial.4  These predictions are made objectively,
without regard for "the idiosyncrasies of the particular
decisionmaker."42 The federal courts have unanimously held that
"supervised release" or "special parole" is a consequence of a plea
in which a defendant must be informed.43
37 id.
38 Hill, 474 U.S. at 57.
39 Id. at 59.
40 id
41 Id See also Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1984).
42 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
43 See People v. Melio, 760 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). See
also Ferguson v. United States, 513 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1975).
[Vol 21
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Although similar in nature, the New York Court of Appeals
has adopted a different approach for measuring counsel's
performance." In People v. Baldi,45 the court established the
standard for measuring counsel's performance under the New York
Constitution, "[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the
circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the
time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided
meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have
been met."46
The phrase "meaningful representation" is not synonymous
with "perfect representation."47 Rather, a defendant has received
effective assistance of counsel when "he or she receives an
advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the
apparent effectiveness of counsel."4
It is critical for the defendant to show that counsel did not
demonstrate any strategic or necessary reasoning for their
deficiency. 9  The courts evaluate counsel's representation
objectively, and will hold counsel's performance to be
constitutionally legitimate if he could demonstrate some reasoning
for his legal strategy. °  The courts focus on the quality of
"People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998).
4' 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981).46 Id. at 405.
47 People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995).
48 Id
49Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587.
50 See People v. Lane, 457 N.E.2d 769, 770 (N.Y. 1983).
2005]
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representation "as a whole rather than its particular impact on the
outcome of the case." 5'
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply the "harmless
error" analysis in cases involving "substantiated claims of
ineffective assistance [of counsel]."52 The harmless error analysis
"involves a determination as to whether the Supreme Court's
failure to inform the defendant of postrelease supervision affected
his decision to plead guilty."53 Under this analysis, the defendant
must show that "he would not have entered his guilty plea if he had
been properly advised [of the consequences of his plea]."54 The
courts cannot be held liable for failing to advise a defendant on all
of the consequences of his plea. Therefore, the courts have
distinguished between those in which a defendant must be advised,
or "direct consequences," and those in which the courts need not
inform a defendant, or "collateral consequences."55
In New York, mandatory post release supervision is
considered to be a direct consequence of a plea. 6 The courts
understand the importance for a defendant to be informed of "each
essential component of the sentence agreed upon for a guilty plea
to be deemed to have been knowing and voluntary."57 In addition,
the requirement of post release supervision is automatically
51 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
52 Id.
51 Melio, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
54 See People v. Mason, 768 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
55 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267.
56 See People v. Goss, 733 N.Y.S.2d 310, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). The
Court of Appeals has not yet addressed this issue.
57 id.
[Vol 2 1
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included in every determinative sentence in accordance with Penal
Law Section 70.45."8 A violation of this supervision, at any time,
will "subject the defendant to a further period of imprisonment of
at least six months and up to the balance of the remaining period of
post-release supervision.'"" Given the serious nature and
consequences which a period of mandatory post release
supervision entails, New York considers this a direct consequence
that has a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect" on a
defendant's sentence.60
In contrast, collateral consequences will not result in
vacating a plea because "they are peculiar to the individual and
generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does
not control."'6' For example, failure to warn of loss of the right to
travel abroad, civil service employment, or to possess firearms are
all considered collateral consequences. 2
The Court of Appeals has not adopted the two-prong
analysis that resulted from Stiickland.63 The court contends that
this test is not determinative of ineffective assistance of counsel
under the New York Constitution.' A defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance to counsel is not measured by whether
58 Id. at 314. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2004) states in pertinent
part: "Each determinative sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional
period of postrelease supervision."
59 Goss, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
60 Id. (quoting Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267).
61 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268.
62 See Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781(5th Cir.
1976).
63 People v. Leslie, 586 N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (N.Y. Misc. 1992).
20051
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he would proceed with a trial rather than enter into a guilty plea if
he was told the consequences of his actions. Rather, the New York
Court of Appeals takes a broader approach and looks to whether
the attorney's representation to his client was "meaningful."65
The main difference between the federal and state standards
for determining whether counsel's representation was effective is
that the New York Court of Appeals has adopted a more "flexible"
standard.' The New York standard focuses on counsel's
reputation as a whole, and seeks to ensure that the defendant was
treated fairly rather than perfectly. 7  In contrast, the federal
standard may seem more precise. Rather than a broad
interpretation of "meaningful representation," the United States
Supreme Court adopted a specific two-part inquiry.6" Under this
standard, a defendant must prove more than that he received less
than adequate representation; he must also show that "the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different."69 However, both
courts recognize the constitutional importance of guaranteeing
adequate right to counsel." They both premise their standards
behind the notion of preserving the "unique adversarial system of
criminal justice, the underlying presupposition of which is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
64 1d
65 id.
66 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587.
67 People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. 2000).
68 id.
69Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
[Vol 21
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free" and "the necessity to insure the defendant that he is receiving
fair treatment "in the adversary criminal process."'"
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court' and New
York Court of Appeals have adopted two different standards for
determining a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.72
The federal standard requires the defendant to show that he would
not have pleaded guilty and, instead, would have proceeded to
trial.73 The New York standard does not require such a showing.
New York courts reject the "harmless error analysis" adopted in
Strickland.74 Alternatively, the court requires that counsel provide
their client -with "meaningful representation."75 Although the
standards are different, both the Federal and State Courts seek to
adhere to the general principle that "all defendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent
counsel."76
Ellyn Wilder
70 People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 386 (N.Y. 1983).
7 1 id
72 Henry, 744 N.E.2d at 114.
73 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
74 Lane, 457 N.E.2d at 771.
75 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 400.
76 McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
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